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Introduction
Truth is sometimes stranger than fiction, especially when it comes to
real life incidents involving artists' moral rights. Over the years I have
been involved in scores of art mutilation and destruction cases, mostly
under the ground-breaking California statute but also under other state
statutes' and, more recently, under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.
Almost every case has involved unusual facts which often stretch the
legal imagination and show how moral rights legislation must be ap-
plied-and amended-in order to function effectively in the real world.
It is in the areas of subject matter, recognized quality (stature),
waiver, mens rea,2 fair use, and damages that I have encountered some
unusual applications of statutory moral rights law. Thus, the following is
a discussion of these and other areas of controversy as illustrated by
some of the cases with which I have had some involvement as an attor-
ney and journalist.
This article describes how the law has been or could be applied to
unusual situations as well as the most commonly litigated issues.
I
Subject Matter
By far the most commonly litigated issue is subject matter. The
question is whether the work is protected subject matter under the stat-
ute. In the Cole3 case, the artist had created a work consisting of 54 one-
dollar bills sewn onto a canvas. The defendant, who had purchased the
work at a charitable fundraising auction and hoped to profit from its
resale, nonetheless decided that it would be easier to recoup some of his
initial outlay by stripping the dollar bills from the piece and spending
them. This case, having occurred many years ago, had to be brought
under the California statute which protects only certain paintings, draw-
ings, sculptures, and original works of art in glass.4 Since the work had
to qualify as a "painting" or "drawing" to be protected, there was an
1. Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws: Hearings on S. 1198 [The Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1989] before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
Peter H. Karlen).
2. "A guilty or wrongful purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990). The
mens rea usually required in moral rights statutes is "intention" or "gross negligence." See,
e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3),(c)(2) (Supp. III 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c) (West 1982).
3. Peter H. Karlen, Art Destruction: The Viki Cole Case, ARTWEEK, Dec. 10, 1983, at 3.
In the text, if the artist's surname is used, the case has generally been litigated and publicized.
Where surnames are not used, the case generally has not been widely publicized but in most
cases has been litigated.
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2).
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issue regarding coverage under the California Art Preservation Act.
Moreover, the defendant even argued that he was affirmatively entitled to
spend the currency because of federal currency laws which encourage the
free circulation of currency,5 a rather unusual argument but typical of
the ploys used to counter moral rights claims.
An artist who created a permanently mounted mosaic was also con-
cerned with subject matter.6 Since the mosaic did not consist of hand-
painted tiles but rather pre-colored tiles, enforcing moral rights would
have been very difficult considering the problems of proving the work
was a "painting."
Such cases show that both state' and federal statutes,8 which give
limited definitions to the terms "fine art" and "work of visual art," rule
out protection for true works of fine art in media other than those speci-
fied by the statute. This is the case in spite of other artists' rights statutes
which have much broader definitions of "fine art."9
In Botello v. Shell Oil Co., ° which we were only briefly consulted
on, the defense of lack of subject matter protection was taken to an ex-
treme. The defendants successfully argued to the trial judge that a mural
was not a "painting" under the California statute and therefore was un-
protected." Because neither side had cited a number of earlier cases
showing that a mural is considered a painting, including a U.S. Supreme
Court opinion, 2 the case was appealed, and an appellate court held that
a mural is, indeed, a painting.' 3
There are cases, however, especially involving the extremes of ap-
plied art and conceptual art, where moral rights protection is questiona-
5. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 333 (1988)(a statute inapplicable to the artist's work).
6. See Peter H. Karlen, Legal Definitions: Their Importance, 4 ART CALENDAR, Sept.
1990, at 7. See generally Peter H. Karlen, What is Art?: A Sketch for a Legal Definition, 94 L.
Q. REV. 383 (1978).
7. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s to - 16t (West 1992);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-2151 to -2156 (West 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231,
§ 85S (West Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1964); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A: 24A-1 to -8 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-2 to -3 (Michie 1978); N.Y.
ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01, 14.03 (West 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110
(1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2 to -6 (West 1987).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1989).
9. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1738(b) (West 1985). The California law governing the
consignment of fine art defines "fine art" as "a painting, sculpture, drawing, work of graphic
art (including an etching, lithograph, offset print, silk screen, or work of graphic art of like
nature), a work of calligraphy, or a work in mixed media (including a collage, assemblage, or
any combination of the foregoing art media)."
10. 229 Cal. App. 3d 1130(1991). See Karlen, Legal Definitions. Their Importance,
supra note 6, at 7.
11. Botello, 229 Cal. App. 3d.at 1138.
12. United States v. Perry, 146 U.S. 72 (1892) (citing wall panels as "paintings").
13. Botello, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1130.
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ble. In W.T.'s case the plaintiff, an extremely skilled artist and model
builder, had constructed a model fleet of ships and placed them on exhi-
bition at a museum. Without warning to the artist, much of the collec-
tion was put in storage rooms. During their lunch hour, workmen, some
with peanut butter and jelly on their hands played with the model ships,
as if they were bathroom toys, resulting in destruction and mutilation of
the ships which had taken hundreds of hours apiece to build.
Notwithstanding the incredible skill, research, and labor devoted to
these works, one legal issue was whether the pieces were works of "fine
art" such that the moral rights legislation could apply. If the legislation
could apply, then why not apply moral rights to architectural, airplane,
and other models which, though perhaps technically "sculptures," are
not "fine art?" Arguably, the federal statute's exclusion of "models" and
"applied art" 4 could now rule out protection.
At the other extreme from applied art is conceptual art. In the case
of H.A.,15 the artist had spent considerable time, effort, and money trav-
eling around the United States, gathering samples of sand and dirt from
land on or surrounding U.S. military installations and nuclear plants.
Each sample was segregated and labeled and became part of the piece.
After a successful display of the conceptual piece in a museum, the work
was stored at an art storage facility. Thereafter, without the artist's
knowledge, the owners of the storage facility moved all the art to a new
building. To convenience themselves, and using the motto that "sand is
sand is sand," rather than move all the containers of sand separately,
they emptied them into one pile and moved the pile to the new facility.
Naturally, the artist was justifiably outraged. However, unfortunately
the artist failed to attain a full recovery from the owners of the storage
facility.' 6 A lesson learned from cases like this is that, unless a concep-
tual work comprises a painting, drawing, print, sculpture, or protected
photograph, it may not enjoy statutory moral rights protection. Here the
labeled sand may not have fallen in any of these categories, though it was
a very impressive conceptual piece.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
15. See Peter H. Karlen, Protecting Conceptual Art, ARTWEEK, Dec. 12, 1987, at 14.
16. According to what I was told by one of the trial witnesses, since we didn't handle the
[Vol. 15:929
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II
Mens Rea
Another oft-litigated issue is the defendant's mens rea. Those state
statutes that recognize the integrity right, 7 as well as the federal stat-
ute,1 8 generally require physical damage to the artwork to be intentional,
with some exceptions for acts of "gross negligence." 19
Strictly speaking, especially from the vantage point of criminal law,
intention is different than knowledge, recklessness, or negligence.
20
Judging from our experience, intent to destroy or mutilate the art or the
knowledge that the destruction would necessarily result from the defend-
ant's conduct will probably satisfy the mens rea requirement. But there
are some interesting borderline cases.
In Baden,2 the artist created a sculpture on a university campus
consisting of steel ramps mounted on concrete bases and installed in a
ravine. It was as much a landscape work as a sculpture, since the piece
consisted of the ramps in relation to the ravine. The ramps by them-
selves, as ordinary steel constructs, would not necessarily be considered
sculptures unless viewed as "ready-mades" a la Marcel Duchamp 2
When the university decided to build a housing project near the ravine,
all the land was bulldozed including the ravine. Naturally, the construc-
tion company and the bulldozer operators claimed to have had no idea
that the ramps were part of a work of art. The plaintiff could only prove
that they deliberately bulldozed the ravine and deliberately destroyed the
ramps; he could not easily show that they did so knowing that the ramps
were "art." In this kind of situation, it seems the defendant should be
liable and the artist given the benefit of the doubt because a philistine
could avoid liability by claiming he didn't know that a piece was "art. '23
17. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 987; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s to - 16t; MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-2 to -3; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73,
§§ 2101-2110.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 106(a)(3)(A), (B), (c)(2).
19. The California statute and its progeny impose liability at the level of gross negligence
for framers, conservers, and restorers. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(2).
20. See Peter H. Karlen, Mens Rea: A New Analysis, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 191 (1978).
21. See Peter H. Karlen, Art Destruction: The Mowry Baden Case, ARTWEEK, Oct. 1,
1988, at 12.
22. See H.H. ARNASON, HISTORY OF MODERN ART 313-14 (2d ed. 1977).
23. The Baden case reminds me in reverse of what supposedly happened many years ago
at the Tate Gallery in London, where workmen are a lot more "sensitive" to art. At one point
in an exhibition season, the curators wondered why bags of garbage were allowed to accumu-
late in the Gallery. The foreman responded that workmen were not removing the bags because
they thought that the filled plastic bags were a new kind of modern artwork, and they didn't
want to risk destroying it. In any case, Baden resulted in a good settlement for the artist after
the complaint was filed.
1993]
Apart from the construction company and its employees, there was
a similar problem with the university. University officials claimed that,
though they ordered the bulldozing, they had forgotten completely about
the installed artwork. If this were true, then it could be said that the
work was not "intentionally" destroyed, and the university defendants
would not have been liable, unless held liable as a "conserver" acting
with gross negligence.
The problem with the standard of "knowing" or "reckless" destruc-
tion is illustrated by the following cases. In the case of G.F.,24 an artist
and a gallery owner had a dispute as to which of the artist's works should
remain on display. When the artist came to reclaim his works and was
walking out of the gallery with one of his pieces, the dealer grabbed one
end of the framed piece to prevent its departure. A tug-of-war ensued
and the artwork was partitioned much like a wishbone, with one party
getting a slightly bigger piece. Here the dealer clearly knew that her
conduct was likely to damage or destroy the piece, but the question was
whether she intended to do so. In my opinion, when the dealer, collec-
tor, publisher, or vandal knows that her conduct will naturally result in
immediate destruction of a work of art, she should be liable.
In the H.H.25 case there was an even more difficult problem,
namely, that of a work stored under conditions in which destruction will
naturally occur, though over a longer period of time. In this case, the
plaintiff's works were stored by defendants in a place that could be de-
scribed as a shed or "outhouse." In short order the elements destroyed
the works. Though the defendants may not have consciously "intended"
the result, certainly they should have anticipated it. In Baden,26 the con-
duct of bulldozing the works was intentional, but perhaps some defend-
ants had no knowledge that the ramps were works of art; here the
defendant knew the property was artwork and the result was also known
but not necessarily intended. The statute should probably have applied,
but it was a close call.
The federal statute," the California statute, 28 and those modeled af-
ter the California statute,29 impose liability for gross negligence under
limited circumstances. The California statute applies the gross negli-
gence standard to framers, restorers, and conservers, which gives plain-
24. Litigation resulting in a monetary settlement for the artist.
25. Since we were only consulted on the case in the beginning, the outcome is unknown,
though I believe the case went to litigation.
26. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B),(c)(2).
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(2).
29. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 231, § 85S; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-2 to -3;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110.
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tiffs a greater opportunity for recovery. With this standard, failure to
exercise the "slightest degree of care" will suffice; any reckless, knowing,
or intentional conduct will also be sufficient to impose liability.
A case illustrating application of the gross negligence standard was
Schnorr.30 In Schnorr, the "conservers" were no ordinary museum spe-
cialists; rather, they were paint manufacturers and distributors who sold
a product designed to protect murals and other painted surfaces against
vandals and the elements.31 When Schnorr applied the warranted pro-
tective coating to five large murals, he justifiably believed he had pro-
tected them against vandals and moisture. Instead, after a few years, the
protective coating actually stripped his murals off the walls, causing the
painted surfaces to craze, crack, and peel. Because the defendants had
done insufficient testing in connection with the product as applied to
murals, the court was willing to allow a jury verdict for the plaintiff
under the "gross negligence" standard applied to conservers under the
California moral rights statute.32 However, though Schnorr ultimately
won the case on a products liability theory, he lost his claim for protec-




Another issue that can cause difficulties with works in buildings is
"removability." If the work may be removed without damaging it, the
artist often has greater rights than if it is not removable. 4 Under state
statutes modeled after the California statute, which protect the integrity
right, the artist must reserve moral rights in art attached to real property
in a recorded instrument affecting the real property. If the artist fails to
do so, the rights are lost with respect to non-removable works." Under
the federal statute, the result is different. For non-removable works in-
stalled in a building after the effective date (June 1, 1991), it is up to the
30. See Peter H. Karlen, Art Destruction: The Michael Schnorr Case, ARTWEEK, Mar.
28, 1987 at 11.
31. The product was a clear hard coating which could be successfully applied to painted
surfaces to keep out moisture and to protect against graffiti.
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(2).
33. See Peter H. Karlen, Art Destruction: The Michael Schnorr Verdict, ARTWEEK, Oct.
31, 1987, at 12.
34. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 113(d) (Supp. III 1991).
35. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s to -116t; MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 231, § 85S; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13- 4B-2 to -3; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73,
§§ 2101-21 10.
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building owner to procure a "waiver" from the artist in the form of a
written consent to installation, otherwise all moral rights apply.36
Though a very large number of cases we have handled involved
works in buildings, the question of removability has usually been clear-
cut and, in most cases, the works were removable. The reason that most
works are "removable" probably stems from what was shown in the
Schnorr37 case.
In Schnorr, tried under California law, the works had been painted
on concrete surfaces, most of them on support pillars under an elevated
highway. Before the paint was applied, the artist had primed the surface
with gesso, then overlaid it with paint and the protective coating. An
expert witness established that such murals theoretically could be re-
moved intact from a concrete surface and installed elsewhere by using a
technique employed in Venice, Italy.3" Since the statute did not specify
that artwork must be "reasonably removable" or "removable with rea-
sonable cost," the plaintiff was able to prevail on the issue of
removability.
Therefore, when faced with a "removability" defense, the plaintiff
should find an expert who can testify that with certain advanced tech-
niques the work can be removed. Naturally, there will be cases like that
of artist A.C.39 where the works are probably not removable. In that
case, one mural had been painted on wood and another on brick, and
both had been damaged by the same preservation product that Schnorr
had used. Fortunately for A.C., the Schnorr litigation had so affected the
defendants that they did not seriously raise the removability issue.
IV
Waiver
With most commissioned works, the agreement between the parties
usually does not have a waiver clause. 4° But contracts for large public
works, commissioned by a developer or public agency, often contain a
waiver clause, albeit usually a defective one.
The state statutes merely refer to a waiver executed in writing.4 '
The federal statute, however, requires more specificity in terms of the
36. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1).
37. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
38. The technique is call "estroppo," which involves actually scraping the mural off the
wall.
39. Litigation which was successfully settled for the plaintiff.
40. A clause in which the artist waives her moral rights, in whole or in part.
41. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s to -116t; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51-2151 to -2156; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 27, § 303; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 24A-1 to -8; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-2 to -3;
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rights being waived and the uses to which the waiver applies.42 Thus, the
purchaser's attorney must be very careful when drafting a waiver
clause.43
In Burton,' a well-known developer contracted with four artists to
install enormous murals around a construction site. The artists con-
tended that, although they understood that the initial installation would
be temporary and the murals used to ornament an otherwise ugly con-
struction site, the murals would later be taken down and displayed else-
where. The developer had other plans. During construction some of the
murals were taken down and dirt was even piled on them. The developer
apparently was confident that his contracts contained a valid waiver,
since under the contracts the artists had transferred all their "owner-
ship" and "property rights" to the developer.45
When suit was commenced, the artists were confronted by a
"waiver" defense which soon collapsed when the court ruled that trans-
fers or waivers of "ownership" or "property rights" did not unambigu-
ously waive moral rights.46 Thus, under both state and federal law, the
artist will not lose rights unless there is a written instrument signed by




In a number of cases, defendants have tried to avoid liability by
claiming that they had no idea what happened to the work. In the
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01, 14.03; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, '§§ 2101-2110; R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2 to -6.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c).
43. In my experience any ambiguities in a buyer-drafted contract will be resolved against
the buyer. See e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 988, 1654.
44. Litigation which resulted in a successful settlement for the plaintiffs.
45. Under California Civil Code § 988, whenever an artist or another owner transfers of
licenses rights under a copyright, ownership of the physical art object remains with the artist
or other owner unless there is a written instrument transferring title of the physical art object.
Moreover, any ambiguity in the instrument is resolved in favor of the artist. Under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(e)(2), ownership of moral rights is distinct from copyright ownership, which in turn is
distinct from ownership of the physical art object. These kinds of statutory rules have
profound effects in case like Burton where the buyer's purchase document does not result in an
acquisition or waiver of all rights.
46. The ruling was in response to the defendants' unsuccessful demurrer to the complaint.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c); CAL. CIv. CODE § 987; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s to
-I16t; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-2151 to -2156; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S;
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 24A-1 to -8; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-4B-2 to -3; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01, 14.03; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73,
§§ 2101-2110; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2 to -6.
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Kupiec48 case, the plaintiff artist had installed a painting at a large hotel.
One day, years after installation, when the artist went to view the work,
it was no longer there. When she questioned the hotel management, they
said they didn't know where it was, that it had been taken down, and
perhaps had been sold or otherwise put into storage. Naturally, if those
excuses were true, the defendants would not have the requisite mens rea
to be liable for destroying the work. When a work is accidentally lost or
disappears, there is no tort. Fortunately, Kupiec was able to compel dis-
covery at the hotel's premises. When we peeled back the wallpaper
where the work had been, the painting was discovered under the wall-
paper, damaged to the point where it could not be restored.
The same defense was also used in the Browne49 case. In Browne,
the artist had installed a 12-foot sculpture at a shopping center mall.
Some time after installation, he discovered that the work was no longer
there. The defendants, including the owners of the mall, claimed that
they didn't know what had happened to the piece, which if true, would
have exempted them from liability. However, Browne subsequently dis-
covered that because one tenant at the mall may have been displeased
with the sculpture, the sculpture had been removed and cut into pieces.
In the Spears5" case, which involved large works securely installed
in the walls of a building, the defendants contended that one of the pieces
was "stolen." The question is who would want to or be able to do that?
We are waiting to hear that aliens from another planet ripped the large
piece out of the wall.
The "disappearance" defense, which is often used, is difficult, but
possible to overcome. With much investigation, particularly through the
use of private investigators who interview a number of people, the truth
may be revealed (often from a dissatisfied ex-employee). Another reason
why the disappearance defense fails is that it is not credible. With most
larger publicly-installed works, a jury will not believe that anyone other
than the defendants had the motive, opportunity, or intention to remove
the work.
48. See Peter H. Karlen, Art Destruction: The Monette Kupiec Case, ARTWEEK, Jun. 11,
1988, at 6.
49. See Peter H. Karlen, Art Destruction: The Tom Martin Browne Case, 6 ART CALEN-
DAR, Sept. 1992, at 9.
50. See Peter H. Karlen, Art Destruction: The John Spears Case, 7 ART CALENDAR, Feb.
1993, at 11.
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Fair Use
As argued in my Senate testimony, "fair use" has little role to play
in a moral rights case.5" In part this is because the considerations set
forth at § 107 of the Copyright Act, which codifies the fair use doctrine,
often have little to do with moral rights.52 The use or misuse of a work
for purposes such as news reporting, scholarship, criticism, review, or
classroom teaching should not necessarily nullify a moral rights viola-
tion. Whether the conduct is carried out by a nonprofit educational or-
ganization, a factor in determining fair use, is not relevant, nor is the
amount and substantiality of the work used or misused. Perhaps the
third and fourth factors listed in § 107, namely the nature of the work
and the effect upon the market for or value of the work, are relevant to
fair use and moral rights; nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine what a fair
use of an art work can be, especially based on the kinds of "fair use"
arguments we have encountered in litigation.
In Baden," the university argued that the artwork was obstructing a
needed housing project and had to go. However, why did the university
allow installation of the artwork in the first place if it were so concerned
about land use? At the very least, it should have secured a written
waiver from the artist in advance. Moreover, the fair use doctrine as
applied to copyrights usually relates to an actual "use" by the defendant,
often for the public good. In a case like Baden, the work is not "used," it
is destroyed.
51. Hearings, supra note 1, at 105-06 (testimony of Peter H. Karlen).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Fair Use. Notwithstanding the provisions of sec-
tions 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by repro-
duction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multi-
ple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature, or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
Id.
53. See Karlen, supra note 21.
1993]
A similar consideration was involved in Rievschl54 in which the art-
ist's large work "Spirit Poles" was installed by a municipality on public
land. When some of the citizens objected to the work, the city wanted to
remove it, claiming the right to control the aesthetics of the city environ-
ment. Again, such destruction would not be a fair use, or a use at all.
The city should have procured a waiver from the artist; in fact, it did
quite the opposite in promising by contract to preserve the work.
The Barnes55 case is another example of buyer dissatisfaction,
though rather belated. In Barnes, the plaintiff had installed a 23-foot-
high concrete and steel sculpture at the corporate headquarters of a well-
known company. Years later, to show its shareholders that it was not
investing in expensive art, the company knocked down the sculpture
without telling the artist. The company argued that the sculpture no
longer fit its image nor the milieu of the corporate headquarters and that
it shouldn't be stuck with the sculpture forever. Again, this was not a
"use," and a written waiver could have been procured in advance. Of
course, in the company's favor was the fact that the sculpture had been
installed years before statutory moral rights were in force, so that the
destruction was less blameworthy than in other cases discussed in this
article.
Perhaps the most extreme argument for changing or destroying a
work was found in the case of M.D.56 There, an art dealer and his devo-
tees believed that the plaintiff's sculptures, placed on consignment at the
dealer's gallery, were "evil." Therefore, the dealer and his coterie held
an exorcism ceremony wherein they carved crosses on the sculptures to
remove the evil. The law, of course, does not recognize such a reason as
just cause for misusing the artist's work.57 A similar case was that of
D.C.58 There the dealer decided that the artist's piece would be better
used if cut up into many smaller pieces, each framed and sold separately.
There would be more money for both the artist and dealer. Of course,
the artist didn't see it that way, and such a cause would not be grounds
for fair use.
We come closer to fair use where the work is changed to "improve"
it. In the case of S.M.,5 9 the buyer was not completely satisfied with
certain aspects of a painting, so he commissioned another artist to add
54. See Peter H. Karlen, Removing Public Artworks: The West Coast Gets Own Version of
Serra Controversy, ART BUSINESS NEWS, Mar. 1990, at 192.
55. Litigation successfully settled for the plaintiff.
56. An unlitigated case informally resolved.
57. Moreover, the kinds of changes may also violate the artist's right to prepare derivative
works under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
58. An unlitigated case that did not result in a formal settlement, to my knowledge.
59. An unlitigated case which did not result in a formal settlement to my recollection.
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some finishing touches in order to "improve" it. One of the improve-
ments concerned the reflection of buildings in water nearby. The way the
piece had been first painted, the image of buildings in the water was
slightly different in size than the buildings themselves. The buyer
thought this was illogical and had them repainted so they would be the
same size. Clearly, this was not a "fair use," and no one has the right to
"improve" the artistic content of a work unless the artist in writing
waives the right to object.
Perhaps the closest case we saw involved an artist, E.K., ° whose
public work was a painted sculpture. After years in the open air, the
colors of the sculpture faded dramatically. The municipality decided to
repaint the sculpture, using its own color scheme. The result, in the art-
ist's eyes, was a disaster. However, what would have been the result if
the municipality had painted the sculpture in the very same colors origi-
nally applied by the artist? Arguably this could be a fair use, especially if
the artist declined to make repairs. This kind of fair use is even men-
tioned in the federal statute, which states that injury to a work in the




There has been much controversy about the requirement that work
be of "recognized quality" to enjoy the integrity right under the Califor-
nia statute62 and its progeny in other states.63 The same controversy sur-
rounded the "recognized stature" requirement under the federal statute
in connection with the artist's right to prevent and remedy destruction.'
Nonetheless, though artists dread the prospect of proving their works
have quality or stature, usually proof is not difficult. This is because in
the majority of cases, the defendant is the person who commissioned the
work, often as the result of a contest, competition, or public bidding pro-
cess. After months or years of conducting a selection process, it is diffi-
cult for a developer or public agency to argue that the winning selection
has no quality or stature. In effect, there is an "estoppel." The defend-
ants in these cases either do not raise the defense, or if they do in the
pleadings, they don't argue the issue in settlement discussions or at trial.
60. An unlitigated case which did not result in a formal settlement to my recollection.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2).
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987.
63. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231. § 85S; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-2 to -3; P.A.
STAT. ANN. tit §§ 2101-10.
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
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The same is true with private collectors. A collector who buys from
a gallery implicitly admits that the piece has some merit merely by mak-
ing the purchase. The same applies to a purchaser of a commissioned
work, since payment of the final installment usually reflects satisfaction.
But there are exceptions to the general rule. For example, as men-
tioned above, the Cole65 case involved a modestly-priced piece purchased
at a charitable fundraising auction, so that the buyer was not put in the
position of overtly recognizing the work's quality. In the H.A.66 case
involving the containers of sand, the art storage facility, not being a
buyer, was not confronted with an estoppel argument and could argue
both that the piece was not protectable subject matter and that it had no
recognized quality.
In the case of H.C. 67 who created a work of computer art, a "qual-
ity" argument was certainly a possibility, again because of the unusual
nature of the art. After all, the artist himself did not necessarily paint the
work with his own hands.
Things are particularly complicated for the artist when she does not
have a substantial reputation. In H.C.'s case, he was already a well-es-
tablished artist who could surmount "quality" problems even though his
work was computer-generated. But in the Kupiec68 case, involving the
painting installed in a hotel, the defendants argued that the plaintiff had
relatively few high-profile public works to her credit. However, the argu-
ment against recognized quality ultimately was not sustained because the
work in question was of very high quality and had been carefully selected
by the hotel.
An example similar to Kupiec is the Singh69 case, in which the de-
fendant municipality, with the goal of publicly displaying the work of
minority artists, selected plaintiff's abstract construction for public in-
stallation. The plaintiff had relatively little prior history of similarly in-
stalled pieces and could have been challenged on the "recognized"
quality issue were it not for the fact that he, too, was the winner in a
public selection process.
In short, the "recognized stature" and "recognized quality" defenses
are best raised by third parties who have had no connection with the
piece as a buyer or commissioning party.
65. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 15, 16 and accompanying text.
67. An unlitigated case resulting in a favorable settlement for the artist. See Peter H.
Karlen, Computer Art, ARTWEEK, Mar. 4, 1989, at 7.
68. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
69. A litigated case we were consulted on which resulted in a plaintiff's verdict.
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VIII
Damages
Whenever the artist remains the owner of the physical art object,
which is rarely the case, damages are easy to ascertain. If the work has
been destroyed, the controversy can be viewed as a conversion claim, and
the principle measure of damages might be the fair market value of the
piece.7" This is particularly true where the work has been left on con-
signment with an art dealer, in which case the "fair market value" award
may also be sustained under artist-dealer relations laws.7' If the work
has been merely damaged or mutilated, the cost of repairs is a logical
measure of damages.72 When the artist no longer owns the physical art
object, however, damages must be otherwise measured.
The "fair market value" of a work of art is not the measure of dam-
ages when the artist is no longer the owner. After all, the artist is not
complaining about injury to a physical piece of property but rather about
injury to her reputation. However, whenever we argued that the cost of
repairs or the cost of redoing the artwork was the proper measure of
damages (particularly in the Schnorr7 3 case where we argued that the
artist should be paid to reinstall the murals), this measure of damages
was not allowed, perhaps for good reason. After all, in most situations
this would not result in the artist being made whole. Because even if the
artist is paid the cost of repairs, there is no reason to believe that the
defendant will allow the artist to spend that money on repairs. Remem-
ber, the defendant has deliberately destroyed the piece to get rid of it.
The principle injury in these cases is to the artist's reputation and
goodwill. Both the state and federal statutes make explicit reference to
reputation,74 with the federal statute using the Bere Convention lan-
guage "honor or reputation.""7- The destruction or mutilation of a pub-
licly-installed work is a major blow to the artist's reputation and
goodwill. Not only is it a direct slap in the face, but the artist can no
longer use the work in his portfolio to generate future business. Many
artists rely upon large, publicly-displayed works as examples their cus-
70. Cf. Peter H. Karlen, Moral Rights in California, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 675, 713-14
(1982).
71. See Peter H. Karlen, Art Destruction: The Max DeMoss Case, ARTWEEK, Feb. 25,
1984, at 3. See also Pelletier v. Eisenberg, 177 Cal. App. 3d 558 (1986) (discussing Cal. Civ.
Code § 1738.6 and allowing the artist to recover fair market value of destroyed work).
72. Karlen, supra note 70, at 712-13.
73. See supra notes 30-33.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2); see also, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a).
75. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, (Paris Text) July
24, 1971, art. 6bis.
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tomers can use to evaluate the artist's work. In the Kupiec7 case, the
artist described how scores of collectors and friends had visited the hotel
just to see her piece. Clearly, the public commission of a large work can
generate the commissioning of many others, so that when the original
piece is wantonly destroyed, the artist loses, not only with respect to
what is generally known as "reputation," but also with respect to poten-
tial future income.
In moral rights cases, it is usually necessary to undertake discovery
as to the identity of the artist, what his reputation is like, how many sales
he has made prior to destruction of the work, the artist's annual income,
and other similar factors. All this information is digested by both sides
and presented at trial, and the jury often picks a number out of a hat.
Surprisingly, in the Schnorr" case, the jury only awarded the artist
$12,000 for injury to reputation, forfive enormous murals. However, the
jury gave the artist $45,000 in mental distress damages.7"
A mental distress claim, therefore, can perhaps result in the greatest
amount of damages awarded. There are property destruction cases al-
lowing mental distress awards, and these cases can be analogized to art
destruction cases. These cases involve destruction or damage of family
heirlooms, coffins or burial sites, and other items of property which have
sentimental value.79 Thus, the artist unable to prove injury to reputation
can establish a case for mental distress damages, especially if she has
sought psychotherapy as a result of the incident, openly displayed her
distress to friends, colleagues, and the public, or otherwise indicated how
terrible the blow has been.
Another claim is injury to the value of the copyright. In most cir-
cumstances, the artist remains the copyright owner of the work, even
where he has waived moral rights or sold the physical art object. This is
especially true since moral rights, copyrights, and ownership of the phys-
ical art object are all separate, distinguishable rights under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(e). However, even if the artist remains the copyright owner,
what is the copyright worth if there is nothing to reproduce? In many
cases, the sculpture or mural can only be reproduced or exploited by
making use of the original artwork itself. So, if the original piece has
76. See supra text accompanying notes 48, 68.
77. See also supra notes 30-33, 37, 73 and accompanying text.
78. This was a rather surprising verdict because the size and high quality of the artist's
murals greatly outweighed the mental distress considerations. Of course, juries do different
things in different communities, usually depending upon how public art is appreciated and
perceived in the community.
79. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., 523 P.2d 662 (1974) (personal property
to be used for shop inventory destroyed by carrier); Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal. App.
3d 844 (1970) (loss of jewelry left at jewelers).
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been destroyed and the artist has kept no transparencies or molds, then
there is no way to properly reproduce the piece, and the copyright be-
comes valueless.8° This point has been argued both successfully and un-
successfully, but since the unsuccessful arguments were made before the
enactment of the federal legislation and to state court judges unfamiliar
with copyright law (an area in which the federal courts usually have ju-
risdiction8 ), I am somewhat confident that injury to copyright will be
recognized in moral rights cases in the federal courts.
From surveying all our cases we found recoveries for moral rights
violations (by settlement, judgment, or otherwise) range from seven to
ten times the original purchase price for the art. Even for pieces which
were donated or otherwise had no purchase price, recoveries were still in
the tens of thousands of dollars. These recoveries reflect the notion that
costs of repair, fair market value, or original purchase price are not the
proper measures of recovery when the artist no longer owns the artwork.
Naturally, with small, privately displayed works, the awards are
smaller. For example, for artist A.W. the case was deliberately kept in
small claims court. There, A.W.82 had given drawings to a girlfriend as a
gift. When they broke up, he got the drawings back in the mail-torn up
with nasty words written all over them.
Ix
Joint Works
Surprisingly, in our experience joint authorship and joint ownership
questions have rarely arisen. This is true even though a number of our
cases here involved jointly-created works. Typically, the artists join
forces against third parties who have moved or mangled the work.
But when a joint authorship or ownership question arises, the law
presently provides little guidance, 3 and those few rules that exist are
dreadfully wrong. A few state statutes touch on joint authorship but
provide few rules.84 The federal statute on moral rights presumably car-
ries with it the joint authorship rules that govern copyrights and also
(unjustifiably) allows any joint author to waive moral rights, even against
80. See Karlen, supra note 70, at 712.
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
82. As I recall, the case resulted in a judgment for the artist.
83. See Peter H. Karlen, Joint Ownership of Moral Rights, 38 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A.
242, 245-49 (1991).
84. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s to -l16t; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51-2151 to -2156; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 27, § 303; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 24A-1 to -8; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-2 to -3;
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01, 14.03; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110; R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2 to -6.
1993] MORAL RIGHTS AND ARTISTS
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
the wishes of the others.8 5 Perhaps this is in keeping with the rule that
any joint copyright owner can grant a non-exclusive license without con-
sent of the other owners.86
However, moral rights laws need their own peculiar joint authorship
rules, preferably set forth by statute, otherwise the courts will spend de-
cades developing and interpreting these rules.87
X
Preemption
One battleground of the near future will be preemption. If either
plaintiff or defendant believes that federal law will be more favorable to
his cause than state law he may argue that the state statute is preempted
under 17 U.S.C. § 301(f). Similarly, either party who feels that state
court litigation under a state statute will be more advantageous will fight
preemption.
Section 301 treats moral rights similarly to copyrights; namely, it
preempts all state causes of action involving the same subject matter and
same rights. In my view preemption litigation will not center around
whether the rights are equivalent - because they generally are - but
rather whether the artwork is protectable subject matter under the fed-
eral statute.
Of course, there could be some litigation as to whether the rights are
equivalent. For example, state statutes generally give the right to dis-
claim credit whenever there is a "just and valid reason,"88 whereas the
federal statute, as to mutilated works, requires the artist to show "preju-
dice" to "honor or reputation." The difference in applying the federal
and state standards is evident from analyzing the situation of artist
E.K.89 Would the municipality's repainting of the sculpture cause preju-
dice to honor or reputation? Probably not, but it would provide the art-
ist with a just and valid reason for disclaiming credit, since most artists
do not want their works redone without their participation. Therefore,
the question for artists who cannot prove prejudice to honor or reputa-
tion is whether they have a remedy. They cannot qualify for a remedy
85. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e).
86. See H.R. Report No. 101-514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1990).
87. See Karlen, supra note 83, at 242.
88. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s to -1 16t; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51-2151 to -2156; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 27, § 303; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 24A-1 to -8; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-2 to -3;
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01, 14.03; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110; R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2 to -6.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
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under the federal statute, but can they go back to state court and apply
the state law as an alternative, or has the state law been preempted?
With subject matter issues in the area of preemption, the answers
are a bit more straightforward, but the results can be interesting. In a
current case we are handling, the plaintiff would prefer state court reme-
dies and state court venue. However, the trick is to file in federal court
and have the defendants think the plaintiffs want federal law to apply.
Then the defendants will bring a motion to dismiss based on lack of sub-
ject matter coverage, and the case will be sent back to state court. In
other cases, the parties have the opposite preference. 90
State laws are desirable because they do not have so many require-
ments. If an artist wants to disclaim credit for a work, a "just and valid
reason"9 is sufficient, and it is not necessary to prove "prejudice to
honor or reputation." 92 Moreover, with physical injury amounting to
destruction, it is probably easier to establish "recognized quality" as re-
quired by many state statutes than "recognized stature" under the fed-
eral statute. However, one of the greatest advantages of the federal law is




In every litigated moral rights case, we have been faced with the
argument that the statute is unconstitutional, for example, because it
constitutes an unlawful taking of property without just compensation.93
This argument has never been successful and has never advanced beyond
the pleadings or law-and-motion stage of the proceeding. After all, if the
constitutionality of aesthetic zoning, 94 historic preservation, 95 and resale
royalties96 laws can be sustained, then moral rights laws are constitu-
90. This reminds me of the old Russian joke of two rival merchants meeting on a train.
One asks the other, "Where are you going?" The other replies, "I am going to Minsk," to
which the questioner responds, "You are just trying to trick me. Because you are saying that
you are going to Minsk, you want me to believe you are really going to Moscow, whereas I
know you are lying, because you are going to Minsk."
91. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s to -116t; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51-2151 to -2156; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 27, § 303; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 24A-1 to -8; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-2 to -3;
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01, 14.03; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110; R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2 to -6.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
94. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
95. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
96. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980).
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tional. Ownership of physical property does not necessarily confer the
untrammeled right to alter, destroy, or otherwise dispose of it.97 More-
over, no court today is likely to rule the federal statute unconstitutional




Time, that healer of all wounds, certainly inflicts some on artists. In
the Schnorr case,98 the artist lost some claims under the California Art
Preservation Act (though he prevailed on a products liability theory) be-
cause he bought the art preservation product that destroyed his murals
before the effective date of the Act, January 1, 1980.9' The same problem
arose in the Spears" case. There, the defendants claimed they altered
and removed artwork from the building on May 29, 1991, only three
days before the effective date of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990,
June 1, 1991."° '
Naturally, because of the statute of limitations under the federal
law, 0 2 defenses based on alleged conduct before the "effective date" of
the legislation will largely disappear. Nonetheless, the statute of limita-
tions itself will remain a hot litigation topic. Unlike state statutes, which
often have an alternative limitations period (e.g., one year from date of
discovery)," °3 federal moral rights actions must be brought within three
years of the act complained of."° This is because the laws governing
moral rights are embedded within the copyright laws, are enforced like
copyrights, and have the same limitations period. '
0 5
Unfortunately for artists, copyright actions do not accrue based on
"discovery" of the wrong but from the date of the wrong, 0 6 unless there
has been concealment."0 7 This rule, when applied to moral rights cases
97. See Peter H. Karlen, Woridmaking: Property Rights in Aesthetic Creations, 45 J. AES-
THETICS & ART CRITICISM 183 (1986); Peter H. Karlen, Artists Rights Today, 4 CALIF. LAW.
22 (1984).
98. See supra notes 30-33, 37, 73, 77 and accompanying text.
99. California Art Preservation Act, ch. 409, § 1, 1979 Cal. Stat. 1501.
100. See Karlen, supra note 50.
101. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
103. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(i).
104. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 507.
105. Id.
106. See Hoste v. Radio Corp. of Amer., 654 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1981), cited in 3 MELVILLE
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.05 n.2.3.
107. See Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983), cited in NIMMER, supra note
106, § 12.05 n.7.
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can be disastrous because, unlike copyright infringements which are usu-
ally "public" torts, moral rights violations, particularly those of the in-
tegrity right, often occur in isolated private places thousands of miles
from the artist. Many years can elapse before the artist even suspects
that something is wrong. In fact, with works not on public display, the
artist usually finds out many years after the limitations period has ex-
pired. In the Schnorr10 8 case, for example, the limitations period became
an issue because the artist purchased the art preservation product in the
late 1970s and it caused damage which only became visible in the 1980s.
Clearly the limitations period for moral rights should run from dis-
covery, at least as an alternative; or anything other than a public viola-




A disproportionate number of moral rights cases involve claims
against government entities, for which there are two explanations. First,
government entities are particularly aggressive in removing public
artworks. Second, because government-contracted work receives the
widest notoriety for the artist, she will make an extra effort to preserve
the work.
The federal government is an especially difficult opponent for the
artist. In addition to the defenses normally available to local government
entities, there are specific federal statutes which restrict artists' moral
rights claims against the federal government. For example, although the
federal government has waived immunity with respect to copyright
claims and, therefore, presumably, moral rights claims under 17 U.S.C.
§ 501, under federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1498(b)) copyright claims, and
presumably moral rights claims, under 17 U.S.C. § 501, must be brought
in the U.S. Claims Court. Also, the artist will only be able to recover
actual damages or minimum statutory damages.' 0 9 Also, 17 U.S.C.
§ 505 rules out awards of costs and attorneys' fees to the artist; injunctive
relief against the United States is also barred.1" ° Moreover, there is a
provision in the federal statute for a claims process which must precede
the lawsuit."'
108. See supra notes 30-33, 37, 73, 77 and accompanying text.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b).
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 502; 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b).
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In the C.C.11 2 case, the artist had been commissioned by a U.S. gov-
ernment agency to create at least three works of art, two murals and one
large figurative painting. After the figurative painting had been delivered
and the murals painted on government walls, the artist visited the work
site and found that the murals had been whitewashed over and the figura-
tive painting had completely disappeared. The prospect of electing either
actual damages or minimum statutory damages was not very attractive
for the artist. Instead of a case involving willful violation in relation to
three works, which could potentially yield $300,000 in statutory damages
if the defendant were a private person,11 a C.C. was left with proving his
actual damages, which, for works that had not previously received any
publicity, would be difficult to prove against the United States.
State agencies have a quiverful of special defenses and strategies.
First, like the federal government, they can use eminent domain.'1 4 Sec-
ond, they can argue that removal of the art is a justifiable exercise of
police power to protect the health, welfare, or safety of the commu-
nity. 15 In situations like the Rievschl l" 6 controversy and the Serra"7
case, (though Serra was a federal case), the governmental entity some-
times argues that the work is actually dangerous, is an attractive nui-
sance for children, blocks sunlight, prevents the free circulation of air,
allows for the accumulation of garbage, becomes a meeting place for der-
elicts, blocks the view, inhibits a public thoroughfare, or otherwise is just
a plain nuisance. These arguments are often difficult to overcome.
XIV
Litigation Patterns
This article has covered only a few of the issues that arise in art
destruction cases, using only a few of the many cases we have handled.
But hopefully the reader can glean some useful tips. What emerges from
all the cases is one pattern. The first step in most cases is that the artist's
attorney will be confronted by what apparently is a clear-cut violation of
the moral rights statute. But there are always two sides to every story,
112. An unlitigated case.
113. Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), the maximum statutory damages for "willful" infringement
is $100,000. Minimum statutory damages are $500 per infringement, and even as low as $200
in cases of innocent infringements.
114. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. § 257 (1978); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.010-.050 (1982);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 37350.5 (West 1988).
115. See, e.g., People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272 (N.Y.) , appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42
(1963) ("clotheslines" protest work successfully censored); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego,
453 U.S. 490 (1981) (signage unsuccessfully banned).
116. See Karlen, supra note 54 and accompanying text.
117. Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988) (not handled by us).
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and after filing the complaint the artist and her attorney encounter many
unusual defenses, including defenses based on mysterious "disappear-
ance," "fair use," "quality" or "stature," lack of mens rea, and even un-
constitutionality of the moral rights statute. The plaintiff is usually able
to dispose of these defenses but only after spending much time, effort,
and money digging up facts to negate them. In fact, I don't recall a case
in which the artist has been unable to recover, except where the plain-
tiff's work was not protectable subject matter.
The use of frivolous or unfair defenses, typical of litigation in gen-
eral, is not just fluff deliberately thrown at the plaintiff. Usually these
defenses are the product of defense counsel, particularly insurance de-
fense counsel, handling their first art case. One by one, after educating
defense counsel, the defenses are abandoned and the case settled before




The integrity right granted artists by moral rights legislation saves
eyesores as well as masterpieces from destruction. The problem is that
there are perhaps more eyesores than masterpieces, so that the public is
sentenced to viewing these products of misspent monies for a life term or
a term of life plus fifty years, depending on how long the statute pre-
serves the art for involuntary public viewing.' 
18
However, for the practicing lawyer who protects artists' rights there
are at least two benefits. First, enforcing artist's rights raises public con-
sciousness of the importance of art and artists. Second, every once in a
while you might preserve a masterpiece. We should all remember the
sad tale of Benvenuto Cellini, the great Renaissance artist and craftsman
who created legendary masterpieces of which only a small handful sur-
vive, the rest being lost to oblivion through wanton destruction. If only
they had moral rights laws then.
Thus, to all art preservationists, ars longa, vita longa!" 9
118. See Peter H. Karlen, Aesthetic Quality & Art Preservation, 41 J. AESTHETICS & ART
CRITICISM 309 (1983).
119. Idiomatically, "long live artists and their art," following ars longa, vita brevis from
Seneca, De Brevitate Vitae, I ("art is long, life is short").
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